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It should be unnecessary to repeat what so often has been said and
what so plainly is the case: that the availability of the Great Writ
of habeas corpus in the federal courts for persons in the custody of
the States offends no legitimate interest in the enforcement of criminal justice or procedure .... Habeas corpus is one of the precarious heritages of Anglo-American civilization.'
I.

INTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The scope of federal habeas corpus review has been disputed ever
since Congress codified the authority of federal courts to issue writs
of habeas corpus. 2 The Judiciary Act of 1789 confined habeas claims
to prisoners "incustody, under or by colour of the authority of the
United States. ' 3 The Supreme Court further limited the scope of
habeas corpus review in 1830, when it refused to consider habeas
relief if the petitioner had been imprisoned by a court of competent
jurisdiction.' In the period following the Civil War, the Court began
to expand the concept of jurisdiction in its habeas decisions.' For
instance, the Court held that convictions under unconstitutional statutes were void and destroyed the sentencing courts' jurisdiction,, and
* A.B., 1970, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1973, Harvard University. Associate Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law. Director, Kansas Defender Project.
t A.B., 1974; J.D., 1977, University of Kansas.
I Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 440-41 (1963)(Brennan, J.).
2 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-2. For a discussion of the early British
experience, see Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1038,
1042-45 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, I Stat. 82.
Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202-03, 209 (1830).
See generally Developments, supra note 2, at 1045-50.
Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1879).
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that a court lacked jurisdiction to authorize a second punishment for

a crime.7 In 1867, Congress made the writ available to state as well
as federal prisoners, 8 and authorized relief in "all cases where any
person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the
constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States."' Despite
this legislation, the Act was not perceived as an invitation to review
all federal questions decided by the state court; courts still looked to

their broadened interpretations of jurisdiction.1°

In 1915, Frank v. Mangum" marked a departure from this position. The Supreme Court acknowledged that a federal habeas court
was not limited merely to reconsidering the jurisdiction of the sentencing court, but could also review the state determination of a prisoner's federal claim.' Subsequently, the Court reaffirmed this opin-

ion, 3 and in 1942 finally abandoned the fictitious restraint of juris-

diction." A decade later, in Brown v. Allen, 5 which opened the mod-

ern era of federal habeas corpus, the Court clarified its position on
rehearing constitutional claims previously afforded an apparently
adequate corrective process by the state.' 6 The Court eschewed definitive guidelines and placed the decision to reconsider the merits within
Ex parte Lange, 85 U. S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873) (defendant received fine and imprisonment
under a statute authorizing fine or imprisonment; trial court without jurisdiction to impose any
sentence beyond the statutory authorization). In Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885), the
court ordered the release of a prisoner who was convicted without a grand jury indictment.
Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (now 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c)(3) (1970)).
In 1886, in Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886), the Supreme Court heard its first case
brought by a state petitioner; the Court's appellate jurisdiction in habeas cases had been
removed shortly after the passage of the 1867 Act. See Act of March 27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15
Stat. 44. Jurisdiction was not restored until 1885. See Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 353, 23 Stat.
437.
Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385. See note 45 infra.
" See Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and FederalHabeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76
HARv. L. REV. 441, 486-87 (1963).
1 237 U.S. 309 (1915)(defendant alleged that hostile public sentiment influenced trial and
that rendering verdict in his absence violated his rights).
21 Id. at 33-36. The petitioner was denied habeas review, however, because his claim had been
properly adjudicated by the state court.
11 E.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465-68 (1938)(federal habeas court ordered to
determine whether accused intelligently and competently waived sixth amendment right to
counsel); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (federal habeas judge ordered to make
independent determination of merits). Professor Hart felt that Moore "substantially discredited" Frank in that a court may review more deeply than Frank permitted. Hart, The Supreme
Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 105
(1959). Professor Reitz saw Frank as overruled by Moore. Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus:
Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1314, 1329 (1961).
"1 Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942). The Court expressly recognized that the writ was
available to consider the constitutionality of conviction as well as the sentencing court's jurisdiction. Id. at 104-05.
" 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
' Id. at 465-87.
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the "sound discretion" of the federal district judge. 7 All federal constitutional questions presented by state prisoners were cognizable on
federal habeas corpus, and could be relitigated regardless of the adequacy of the state process or the fact that the state had fully and fairly
considered the claim."8
As the substantive scope of habeas corpus review matured, the
Court interposed a procedural restriction between petitioners and
habeas 'elief." 9 Habeas petitioners first had to exhaust state judicial
remedies before they sought federal review.20 Although Congress
eventually codified this requirement, 2' it did not have a debilitating
prophylactic effect on the habeas petitioner's access to a federal
forum 2 for in Fay v. Noia, one of the three habeas corpus landmark
decisions of 1963, the Court characterized the requirement as "a rule
of discretion, avowedly flexible, yielding always to 'exceptional circumstances.' ' 2 3 It "refer[red] only to a failure to exhaust state remedies still open to the applicant at the time he files his application for
habeas corpus in the federal court."24 Therefore, a petitioner would
not be denied federal habeas corpus relief on the ground of exhaustion
if he was barred from further state relief because he failed to make a
25
timely appeal of his conviction.
Townsend v. Sain, the second case of the trilogy, recognized that
Brown provided insufficient guidelines to govern federal review, and
therefore catalogued specific situations which mandated reconsideration.27 In the third case of the 1963 trilogy, Sanders v. United States,"8
11Id. at 460-65.

11Id. at 507-10 (Frankfurter, J., speaking for five Justices). Federal prisoners were also given
the benefits of the decision in Brown. See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
II See Exparte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944); Exparte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
, For a more elaborate discussion of the early history of the exhaustion requirement, see
Developments, supra note 2, at 1093-1103.
2128 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c)(1970). Section 2254(b) provides an exception where "there is
either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner."
- 372 U.S. 391 (1963). In Fay, a state prisoner instituted habeas corpus proceedings to set
aside a conviction allegedly obtained upon a coerced confession. Petitioner's co-defendants had
successfully appealed to reverse similar convictions. Although petitioner had not appealed, the
Court ruled that his petition should have been considered.
"1Id. at 426.
21Id. at 399. Even if a petitioner had deliberately bypassed the once-available state procedure, federal relief was not necessarily foreclosed. Id. at 438-39.
In so holding, the Court, in Fay, adopted the position of Professor Hart, who had soundly
criticized the Court for its contrary opinion in Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394 (1959). See Hart,
The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Forword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV.
84, 112-14 (1959).
- 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
" Id. at 312-13. The federal district court must grant habeas corpus review if:
(I) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the
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the Supreme Court held that federal district courts had discretion to

consider second or successive applications for writs of habeas corpus,
even when the latter application presented a claim identical to one
that had been raised previously. 2'
Although Fay, Townsend, and Sanders defined the contours of
discretionary denial of federal habeas relief, they left the jurisdictional power of federal district courts untouched. 30 But the summer
of 1976 brought the turning point for the expanded scope of federal
2
habeas corpus for state prisoners.3 The decision in Stone v. PowelP
creates serious misgivings about the continued vitality of Fay and

Townsend. In addition, Stone casts an ominous shadow on the integrity of the Supreme Court of the United States.
II.

THE PROBLEM:

Stone v. Powell

On February 18, 1968, Lloyd Powell was arrested for vagrancy in
Henderson, Nevada. During the search incident to his arrest, police
discovered a .38 caliber revolver which implicated Powell in a murder
committed in California the previous night.3 At trial in California,
Powell attempted to have the testimony about the revolver's discovery excluded from trial on the ground that the ordinance under which
he had been arrested was unconstitutionally vague, thereby rendering
the warrantless search invalid. 34 The trial court rejected this contenstate factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the
fact finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full
and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence;
(5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state court hearing; or
(6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas
applicant a full and fair fact hearing. Id. at 313.
- 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
" Sanders said that the federal court may, but was not required to, give controlling weight
to the denial of the prior application when:
(I) the same ground presented in the subsequent application was determined adversely to the applicant on the prior application, (2) the prior determination was on
the merits, and (3) the ends of justice would not be served by reaching the merits of
the subsequent application.
Id. at 15. Although Sanders involved a collateral suit by a federal prisoner under 28 U.S.C. §
2255, it also applies to federal post-conviction relief sought by state prisoners. See e.g.. United
States ex rel. Schnitzler v. Follette, 406 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1969). In effect, Sanders elaborated
on the then current statutory law for all habeas petitioners. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1948). The
Court also acknowledged that whether or not the latter habeas or section 2255 application
presented a ground not previously resolved on the merits, the applicant may be barred if he
has "abused" the privilege of the writ by needlessly splitting his claims between two federal
applications. 373 U.S. at 17-19.
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970).
*' Yet this change had been foreshadowed for several.years. See, e.g., note 187 infra.
* 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
Id. at 469.
Id. at 470.
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tion, and subsequently convicted Powell of murder." The California
District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, and found that the
3
error, if any, in admitting the challenged testimony was harmless.
37
denied.
was
relief
corpus
Powell's attempt to obtain state habeas
Three years after his conviction, Powell filed a petition for federal
habeas corpus relief, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a),38 contending that
the testimony about the revolver should have been excluded as the
fruit of an illegal search."' The district court found that the Nevada
police officer had probable cause to arrest Powell, irrespective of the
constitutionality of the vagrancy ordinance and, therefore, that the
search was permissible as incident to a lawful arrest.40 In the alternative, the court found that any error in admitting the evidence was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.4 In December 1974, the Ninth
Circuit reversed," finding that the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague,' 3 that the arrest was, therefore, unlawful, and that
the testimony should have been excluded. 4 Because the disputed testimony corroborated other evidence, the court concluded that the admission of the testimony was not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. 5
The Supreme Court decision also encompassed a companion case,
Rice v. Wolff," in which defendant Rice was convicted of murder for
the August 1970 bombing death of an Omaha police officer. 7 At
Rice's trial, evidence discovered in a search of his home was introduced, including materials for the construction of explosive devices.' s
The trial court rejected Rice's attempts to suppress the evidence, and
the Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed the conviction, upholding
the validity of the search warrant." In September 1972, Rice filed a
Id. at 469-70.
Id. at 470. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
" 428 U.S. at 470.
For a discussion of the "custody" requirement of § 2254, see Developments, supra note
2, at 1072-79.
" 428 U.S. at 470.
'

3

40 Id.

,Id. at 470-71.
,2Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974).
See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972)(vagrancy ordinance invalidated because unconstitutionally vague).
" The court decided that although exclusion of the evidence would serve no deterrent purposes with regard to police officers who were enforcing statutes in good faith, the public interest
would be served by deterring legislators from enacting unconstitutional statutes. 507 F.2d at
98.
Id. at 99.
" Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1975).
, 428 U.S. at 471.
,5Id. at 472.
,5State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N.W.2d 480 (1972).
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petition for habeas corpus relief in federal district court, contending
that his incarceration was unlawful because of the use of evidence
obtained during an illegal search of his home. 0 The court found that
the warrant was indeed invalid, 5 and rejected the state's argument
that the arrest was justified by exigent circumstances.52 This decision
was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
53
Circuit.
Reviewing these decisions on writs of certiorari, the United States
Supreme Court reversed both circuit courts. But instead of deciding
whether the evidence used to convict the petitioners was unlawfully
obtained, the Court held that because the state courts had "provided
an opportunity for full and fair litigation of [the] Fourth Amendment
claim," 54 federal habeas corpus relief should not have been granted.
III.

ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE COURT'S DECISION

Although Stone v. Powell has a devastating impact on federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction, Justice Powell expressed his opinion for
the six-man majority in terms of a constitutional analysis of the
exclusionary rule. He acknowledged that, under existing precedent,
fourth amendment claims were cognizable under sections 2254 and
2255 of Title 28 United States Code,5 5 and traced the expansion of
federal habeas jurisdiction from its original interpretation as a mere
inquiry into jurisdiction to acceptance of the writ as a remedy for all
federal constitutional claims, including those arising from allegedly
illegal searches and seizures.56 In his analysis of habeas jurisdiction
for fourth amendment claims, however, Justice Powell described its
recent expansion as based on the "view" that the fourth amendment
requires habeas relief when a prisoner is in custody pursuant to a
conviction resulting from illegally obtained evidence.57 Contending
that the Court never considered this view completely, he then rejected
it in favor of his own view of the nature and purpose of the exclusion58
ary rule.

"
52

428 U.S. at 472-73.
Rice v. Wolff, 388 F. Supp. 185, 190-94 (D. Neb. 1974).
388 F. Supp. at 201 (pursuant to a separate evidentiary hearing).

Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1975).
428 U.S. at 481-82, 494.
28 U.S.C. §§2254, 2255 (1970). Section 2255 is the primary post-conviction remedy for
federal prisoners.
" 428 U.S. at 474-480. See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969)(search and
seizure claims allowed in § 2255 proceedings).
'7 428 U.S. at 480-81.
IId. at 481. Of course, the need for compromise in reaching a majority opinion might mean
that Justice Powell's views on habeas corpus do not square precisely with those expressed by
him for the Court. See generally, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 et.seq.
13
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The Court reviewed the development of and rationale for the exclu-

sionary rule,59 and found that the "imperative of judicial integrity,"
violated when a court condones illegal police practices, supplied only
limited justification for the rule. Instead, the "primary justification"
was the deterrence of police transgressions that violate an individual's
fourth amendment rights.6 0 A major consequence of this latter aspect,
the majority argued, is that the exclusionary rule is not a "personal
constitutional right," but merely a "judicially created remedy" intended generally to effectuate the fourth amendment." Therefore, no
individual has a right to the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, 2
exclusion is within the discretion of the court, and is based on a
determination of whether the remedy will further the goal of deterrence in the circumstances of the particular case. 3 With respect to

its application, the exclusionary rule was seen as essentially involving
a balancing process: to the extent that societal costs of excluding
questioned evidence outweigh the deterrent effect on police misconduct, the evidence should be held to be admissible."
Notwithstanding the accuracy of Justice Powell's analysis, it is

more important to note the direction in which the Court is heading
on fourth amendment claims. Seven of the Justices expressed some
doubt concerning the application of the exclusionary rule;"5 in fact,
Chief Justice Burger seemed prepared to abandon it entirely." The
(1973)(Powell, J.,concurring); Tushnet, Judicial Revision of the Habeas Corpus Statutes: A
Note on Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 484 (1975).
5'428 U.S. at 482-89.
428 U.S. at 486.
" Id. at 482, 486. See also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974); accord,
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 536-39 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,28-29 (1968);
Tehan v. United States ex re. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618, 636-37 (1965).
62 See 428 U.S. at 486.
Id. at 486-87. The "societal costs" at trial and on direct review include the belief that
I3
"the focus of the trial, and the attention of the participants therein, are diverted from the
ultimate question of guilt or innocence that should be the central concern in a criminal proceeding. Moreover, the physical evidence sought to be excluded is typically reliable and often the
most probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant." Id. at 489-90.
Thus, the major cost of the rule to the majority was that it "deflects the truthfinding process
and often frees the guilty." Id. at 490. The Court also considered the costs of federal habeas
corpus review-using limited judicial resources, undermining finality, increasing friction between federal and state courts, and upsetting the constitutional balance of federalism. Id. at
491 n. 31.
428 U.S. at 488.
Although Justice White agreed with dissenting Justice Brennan that habeas corpus should
be available to state prisoners to remedy exclusionary rule violations, 428 U.S. at 536-37
(White, J., dissenting), he went on to argue that the rule should not apply where "law enforcement personnel have acted mistakenly, but in good faith and on reasonable grounds," id. at
540, since in such situations there could be no deterrent effect.
66 Characterizing the indirect sanction on police officers that habeas relief would provide as
"sophisticated nonsense," id. at 498 (Burger, C.J., concurring), Chief Justice Burger declared
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importance of Stone to the future of the exclusionary rule may be in

the Court's formulation of theoretical foundations to limit its application. In any event, constriction of the scope of the rule can no
longer be doubted, especially in light of recent Supreme Court decisions;67 the only question is simply how far the limitation will go.
Whatever Stone's effect may be on the exclusionary rule generally, " it clearly has great significance for the future of federal habeas
corpus actions brought by state prisoners. Because the Court believed
that the exclusionary rule has a minimal deterrent effect at collateral
proceedings, which typically occur long after the alleged police misconduct, the Court tipped the scale against utilization of the rule. 9
But the Court also discussed Kaufman v. United States,70 which allowed collateral review for search and seizure claims of federal prisoners. Kaufman assumed that state prisoners had such a right: "Our
decisions leave no doubt that the federal habeas remedy extends to
state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally obtained evidence was
admitted against them at trial."'" Rather than overrule Kaufman or
its predecessors," the Court treated them merely as an unsubstanthat "the exclusionary rule has been operative long enough to demonstrate its flaws." Id. at
496 (Burger, C.J., concurring). More than a decade earlier, he wrote that if the public believes
that law enforcement is hampered by "technicalities," there develops "a sour and bitter feeling
that is psychologically and socially unhealthy." Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?. 14
AM. U. L. REV. 1, 22 (1964). The Chief Justice also clearly stated this view in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 415-18 (1971)(Burger, C.J., dissenting), and
97 S. Ct. 1232,
U.S. -,
more recently, in a different context, in Brewer v. Williams, 1248 (1977)(Burger, C.J., dissenting). ("The result in this case ought to be intolerable in any
society which purports to call itself an organized society. . . . It mechanically and blindly
keeps reliable evidence from juries whether the claimed constitutional violation involved gross
police misconduct or honest human error.").
17 See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976)(exclusionary rule does not forbid
evidence illegally seized by a criminal law enforcement agent of one sovereign to be used in
the civil proceedings of another sovereign) (decided the same day as Stone); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (neither fourth nor fifth amendment precludes search of lawyer's office under warrant which resulted, inter alia, in seizure of memoranda which the attorney had
prepared for his own use); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (retroactivity of warrantless automobile border search decision, Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973), rejected) (Justice Douglas, dissenting, noted the "slow strangulation of the rule," at
561).
Even statutory exclusion under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(1970) recently has been subject to
U.S. __, 97 S. Ct. 658 (1977)(fourth amendlimitation. See United States v. Donovan, ment does not require government to name all persons likely to be overheard in telephone tap).
That question is not the primary focus of this article.
" See 428 U.S. at 489-495.
70 394 U.S. 217.
71 Id. at 225. See. e.g., Mancusi v. De Forte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391
U.S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)(fourth amendment cases where state
prisoners used federal habeas corpus collateral review).
72 Although the Stone majority rejected Kaufman's dictum as to state prisoners, the Court
left open the possibility that Kaufman's holding may still be supported by "the supervisory role
of this Court over the lower federal courts." 428 U.S. at 481 n. 16. Justice Brennan saw no basis
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tiated "view" of the exclusionary rule.73 Moreover, in perceiving
search and seizure claims as lacking constitutional foundations, the
Court avoided the apparent conflict between Stone and the federal
habeas corpus statute, which allows relief to petitioners held in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States."74 The Court then dismissed, as "unjustified," the Kaufman
view that application of the fourth amendment extends to habeas
75
relief for state prisoners with claims of illegally obtained evidence.
The majority's characterization of prior case law affording habeas
review to fourth amendment claims is based on the assumption that
deterring improper police actions is the sole justification for the exclusionary rule. 76 However, the precedent is justifiable on other
grounds as well. First, it is plainly arguable that judicial integrity does
require the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. 77 Second,
Kaufman explicitly rejected the Stone Court's argument concerning
the scope of federal habeas corpus. 7 Another significant ground,
which was not considered adequately by the majority, relates directly
to the essential nature of federal habeas corpus-the need for providing a federal forum for all constitutional claims.7 9 The existing guidelines of Townsend v. Sain" can protect the interests of federalism
sufficiently and give proper deference to the findings of state courts.
But only by insuring that federal judicial review will not be foreclosed
can the guarantee of a federal forum be preserved. 8 Although Stone
under the circumstances of Stone to distinguish between claims brought by state or federal
prisoners. Id. at 507 n.5 (Brennan,. J., dissenting). He therefore concluded that "Kaufman
obviously does not survive." Id. at 519 n.14 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
,1See 428 U.S. 465, 508 n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting); notes 57-58 supra and accompanying
text.
74 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)(1970).
7 428 U.S. at 481.
w'See id. at 486-87.
See, e.g., Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 225, 229 (1969); Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). See Schrock & Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REv. 251 (1974); Comment, Judicial Integrity and Judicial
Review: An Argument for Expanding the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1129 (1973).
See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 292 (1975); Kaufman v. United States,
394 U.S. 217, 228 (1969); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426 (1963); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443, 499-500 (1953). Justice Brennan pointed out that Newsome "held that a state defendant
could file a federal habeas corpus petition asserting Fourth Amendment claims, despite a
subsequent guilty plea, when the State provided for appellate review of those claims. Three
Justices dissented and would have held, as a statutory matter, that Fourth Amendment claims
are not cognizable on federal habeas, but none suggested the 'constitutional' thesis embraced
by the [Stonel Court." 428 U.S. at 519 n. 14.
, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
" See notes 173-76 infra and accompanying text.
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indicates that the Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdiction can serve
this function, 2 as a practical matter certiorari is used infrequently to
review state criminal convictions8 3 and certainly the Court intimates
no inclination to move in that direction on claims charging use of
illegal evidence in state criminal prosecutions. Furthermore, the allo-

cation of judicial resources for determining federal questions is constitutionally an issue to be determined by Congress. 4 Once congressional intent is manifested, any reduction of that authority is a matter
of legislative, rather than judicial, prerogative.8 5 It should not go
unobserved that legislative attempts to restrict the scope of federal
habeas jurisdiction have been unsuccessful." Moreover, amendment
of the federal habeas statute subsequent to judicial expansion of the
scope of the remedy did not alter the principles that collateral relief
is available respecting any constitutional claim and that federal
courts are the proper tribunals to hear those claims. 7
. In short, whatever competency state courts have to decide federal
constitutional questions, 8 the effect of Stone is to preclude congressionally created procedure for federal review of possible errors in
state decisions, at least to the extent that fourth amendment claims
are involved. 9 To be sure, Congress has specifically indicated that
deference should be given to state determinations and has furnished
guidelines for that purpose. 90 But Congress also has declared that the
federal judiciary should have the final word in interpreting federal
s See 428 U.S. at 493 n.35.
'3 For statistical data on this point, see The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV.
56, 279-82 (1976).
U See notes 170-76 infra and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 499-500, 508-510 (1953).
U Proposed Title 28 U.S.C., section 2256, offered as part of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, would have limited review of state criminal convictions to the
certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. See S. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 63-66, 233
(1967). Another proposal would have required a three-judge federal court for review of state
criminal convictions. This proposal was strongly supported by a committee of state court Chief
Justices, but failed. See H.R. 1892, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 36 (1966). See also Note, Proposed
Modification of Federal Habeas Corpusfor State Prisoners-Reform or Revocation?, 61 GEO.
L.J. 1221 (1973).
11 Section 2254 was amended in 1966, after Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), had given a
broad reading to the federal habeas statute then in existence. The 1966 amendments incorporated the guidelines of Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), for deference to state court
findings of fact. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1966).
U For a discussion of this point in Stone, see 428 U.S. at 493-94 at n.35 (majority opinion);
id. at 517, 525-26, 529 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and
Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 523-24 (1963).
" See 428 U.S. at 517-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (extension of Stone to other possible
challenges).
- 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b), (c), (d)(1970). See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
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constitutional claims. 9' Without any doubt, Stone v. Powell has
perverted this mandate.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan vigorously noted that the majority
opinion did not pass muster even when subjected to the Court's own
reasoning." The Court did not question that exclusion of the tainted
evidence admitted at the trials of Powell and Rice was constitution-.
ally required pursuant to Mapp v. Ohio" and later cases. 4 At the
trial and appellate levels, the deterrent effect was deemed sufficient
to tip the judicial balance in favor of exclusion." Only at the level of
federal collateral attack, the majority argued, did the "societal cost"
of employing the exclusionary rule outweigh the deterrent effect on
the distant police misconduct." Concededly, the deterrent effect resulting from use of the exclusionary rule diminishes with the increasing remoteness of the police actions. By the time petitions for federal
habeas review are filed, however, the societal costs of exclusion already should have been incurred. 7 The costs are not greater solely
because the balance is struck at a later stage of the proceeding."
Furthermore, so long as Mapp survives, failure to exclude the evidence at trial is a constitutional error, and, once that error results in
custody, the balancing process is no longer relevant. The federal
habeas corpus statute provides for review of any custody in violation
of the Constitution;99 this authority cannot properly be restricted by
the application of a judicial balancing test.
In sum, the exposition in Stone leaves a great deal to be desired.
The Court avoided critical issues and neglected to distinguish adequately precedent that reached contrary results on the constitutional
quality of the exclusionary rule. Also, the decision does not squarely
confront the scope of existing habeas jurisdiction statutes. Although
it is cast in a constitutional mold, Stone restricts this jurisdiction
without overruling contrary authority. Further, the case fails to specify precisely what constitutes a "full and fair opportunity for litigation" in state courts.100 Presumably, the Court intended that the standards of Townsend v. Sain'0 would govern, because of both the IanSee 428 U.S. at 528 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
428 U.S. at 514 n.lI (Brennan, J., dissenting).
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
'4 See, e.g., cases cited in note 71 supra.
See 428 U.S. at 486-87 (majority), 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
N See notes 63-63 supra and accompanying text.
' See 428 U.S. at 512-13 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'z

"
"

Id.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)(1970).
See 428 U.S. at 494.
1 372 U.S. 293 (1963); see note 33 supra.
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guage used and a brief and vague reference to Townsend.02 But, if
this is actually the correct interpretation, Stone has added virtually
nothing, for in Townsend the Court required federal courts to hold
evidentiary hearings when certain criteria indicated that state courts
had not given habeas corpus applicants a "full and fair hearing" in
direct or collateral proceedings on the claims raised in the habeas
petition. 0 3 To add something to Townsend, Stone must be read as a
mandatory instruction to federal district courts that they not afford
relief on fourth amendment issues to state prisoners whose grievances
were resolved in the state courts. If this is the case, however, conflicts
with existing statutes and case law cannot be avoided. 10 4 Further, if
Stone forecloses habeas relief merely by providing the defendant an

"opportunity" to litigate his claim (whether or not the opportunity
was exercised), then the decision is inconsistent with Fay v. Noia,05
in which the Court held that a defendant's failure to exhaust state
judicial remedies no longer available to him, would not bar habeas
relief unless the defendant deliberately bypassed them. 10
One reason that the full import of Stone is difficult to assess is that
the nature of the Court's holding is somewhat elusive. The majority
states three differing forumlations of its ruling: "where the State
provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth
Amendment claim,"'0 7 (1) "the Constitution does not require that a
state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground
1 428 U.S. at 494 n.36.
372 U.S. 293, 312-18 (1963). Of course, under Townsend, even if a federal evidentiary
hearing is not otherwise required, the district court has the discretion to hold one. Id. at 31819.
014 The Fifth Circuit used Townsend criteria to interpret Stone's "opportunity for full and
fair litigation," but carefully distinguished Townsend as intended primarily to determine the
need for a federal evidentiary hearing, while Stone determines whether or not federal habeas
jurisdiction may be accepted at all. O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204, 1211 (5th Cir. 1977).
The result of this distinction is a two-tiered test:
where the facts are in dispute, full and fair consideration requires consideration by
the fact-finding court and at least the availability of meaningful appellate review by
a higher state court. Where, however, the facts are undisputed, . . . the full and
fair consideration requirement is satisfied where the state appellate court, presented
Fourth Amendwith an undisputed factual record, gives full consideration to [the]
ment claims.
Id. at 1213 (original emphasis). Cf Talavera v. Wainwright, 547 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1977)(circumstances in which remand is necessary on issue of full and fair opportunity).
"' 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
I04
Id. at 398-99, 438-40. On deliberate bypass, see, e.g., Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536
(1976); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973); Murch v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41 (1973);
Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 450-52'(1965). Justice Brennan argued that Stone has
converted the exhaustion requirement, relating to the timing of federal review, into a rule
precluding it. 428 U.S. at 512-13 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1 428 U.S. at 482, 494.
"03
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that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search and seizure was
introduced at his trial"; 08 (2) a state prisoner may not be granted
federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that the evidence obtained
in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial"; 0 9
and (3) "a federal court need not apply the exclusionary rule on
habeas review of a Fourth Amendment claim"" 0 absent a showing
of lack of opportunity for full and fair litigation of the claim in the
state courts. This final expression appears in a footnote to the second
formulation, and states that the decision does not limit federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction."' Under the first statement of the Court's rule as
well, a federal court in its sound discretion could consider a petition
from a state prisoner alleging a fourth amendment claim that previously had been litigated in the state courts. But under the second
formulation, such relief appears to be precluded.
Despite this confusion, the circumstances and background of Stone
suggest that the holding is a compulsory bar to federal juridsiction
over state prisoners' fourth amendment claims. Since the Court did
not dispute the earlier federal decisions regarding Powell and Rice,
the Court might have permitted the convictions of two men to be
vacated as proper exercises of discretion within the jurisdiction of
federal habeas corpus. Alternatively, the cases could have been remanded to their respective courts of appeals for rehearing in light of
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the exclusionary rule balancing
test. Instead, the circuit court decisions were reversed, with the Supreme Court intimating that exercise of jurisdiction was entirely inappropriate, and that the rule carved in Stone was mandatory.
This rigid construction has been followed substantially. For example, the Fifth Circuit has interpreted Stone as a "bar" to federal
relief,"' and will consider the fourth amendment claims presented by
state prisoners "only upon a showing that the state failed to provide
3
• . . an opportunity for full and fair litigation of [the] claim.""
Since Stone was decided, only two circuits have allowed relief under
Id.
I at 482 (emphasis added).
Id. at 494 (emphasis added).
I10
Id. at 494-95 n.37 (emphasis added).
"Our decision does not mean that the federal court lacks jurisdiction over such a claim,
but only that the application of the rule is limited to cases in which there has been both such a
showing and a Fourth Amendment violation." Id.
"' White v. Alabama, 541 F.2d 1092, 1093 (5th Cir. 1976). The Fifth Circuit further clarified
its interpretation of Stone in O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1977): "Despite
the assertions of the Supreme Court in Stone to the contrary, we would be blind to reality to
pretend that the practical effect of that decision is not a limitation on federal court jurisdiction."
Id. at 1211-12.
"I Caver v. Alabama, 537 F.2d 1333, 1335-36 (5th Cir. 1976). The court acknowledged that
this was a difficult burden for a state prisoner to meet. Id. at 1336. See also note 129 supra.
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these circumstances. In Gates v. Henderson,"' the Second Circuit
also construed Stone to "foreclose" habeas review,"' but then applied
the criteria of Townsend v. Sainm" to grant relief after the finding that
an opportunity for full and fair litigation of the claim had not been
provided in the state courts."' One judge dissented, arguing that this
approach was "an artful effort to circumvent Stone" because of the
failure to "accord any deference to the strong view expressed in
Stone, based on deeply rooted public policy, that the exclusionary
rule is unique and should not be invoked on habeas petitions under
the circumstances [therein] described by Mr. Justice Powell . . .""'
The dissenter recommended the following holding, which many
courts have applied: The dismissal of the petition is "[aIffirmed on
the authority of Stone v. Powell.""'
IV.

PROBLEMS WITH THE COURT'S SOLUTION: JUDICIAL INTEGRITY
IN A DISINGENUOUS SYSTEM

A.

Judicial Integrity: The Fourth Amendment Conception

As discussed earlier, the Stone Court opted for the deterrence
rather than the judicial integrity rationale to explain the exclusionary
rule. This decision was the culmination of some fifty years of the
Court's dealing with the idea of the "imperative of judicial integrity."
Although the concept was not so formulated until 1960,10 it was
conceived in 1928 in the Holmes and Brandeis dissents in Olmstead
v. United States.'2 ' According to Justice Holmes:
no distinction can be taken between the Government as prosecutor
and the Government as judge. If the existing code does not permit
district attorneys to have a hand in such dirty business [as using at
"' __
F.2d __, 20 CRIM. L. RPTR. 2409 (2d Cir. 1976), rehearing en banc granted, No.
76-2065 (2d Cir., March 7, 1977). The other case was decided by the Third Circuit. Petillo v.
New Jersey, - F.2d , 19 CRIM. L. RPrR. 2534 (3d Cir. 1976).
"I For the treatment of Stone v. Powell by other circuits, see e.g., Williams v. Ohio, 547
F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Placek v. Illinois, 546 F.2d 1298 (7th Cir. 1976);
Vitello v. Gaughan, 544 F.2d 17 (Ist Cit. 1976); Bracco v. Reed, 540 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1976);
Chavez v. Rodriguez, 540 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1976); Poindexter v. Wolff, 540 F.2d 390 (8th
Cit. 1976); Fankboner v. Paderick, F.2d -, 19 Crim. L. Rptr. 2463 (4th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 171 n.68 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
--1 F.2d at , 20 CRIM. L. RPTR. at 2410.
"I ld. at -,
20 CRIM. L. RPTR. at 2410-11 (Timbers, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2410 (Timbers, J., dissenting). For a case in which a district court grant of habeas
I'
relief was reversed on appeal, see, e.g., Bracco v. Reed, 540 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1976).
'" Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960)(Stewart, J.) (striking down the "silver platter
doctrine," whereby a federal court would admit evidence unconstitutionally obtained by state
officers, provided that no federal officer had participated in the illegal search).
...277 U.S. 438 (1928)(refusing to disallow use of incriminating evidence secured through
an illegal wiretap of defendant's premises by federal officials).
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trial evidence which has been obtained by means contrary to the4

Federal Constitution], it does not permit the judge to allow such
iniquities

122

Justice Brandeis added that
[iun a government of laws, existence of the government will be im-

perilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government
is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches
the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If a govern-

ment becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites
anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law
the end justifies the means-to declare that the Government may

commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-

would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doc-

23
trine this Court should resolutely set its face.

The judicial integrity doctrine focuses on the "clean hands" of the
criminal justice process,'24 and the countenance of the judiciary in the
public eye. By admitting the fruits of an unconstitutional or illegal
police search into evidence, a court implicitly sanctions such misbe25
havior, and thereby becomes a confederate in the improper activity.1
A particularly important feature of the early theory was its exacting quality. According to Justice Brandeis, a court could preserve its
untainted image only by refusing to admit illegally obtained evidence. 2M No distinction was made between trial and extra-trial proceedings, nor does it appear, in light of the doctrine's rationale, that
any distinction was intended. Although the holding of Stone v. Powell
Id. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J.,dissenting). See also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 39293 (1941). This rationale was first accepted by the Court in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332, 345 (1943), and subsequently reaffirmed in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-23
(1960); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479-80
(1966); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968); and Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378, 385-86 n.9
(1968).
The development of the philosophy expressed in Olmstead has been traced to the HolmesBrandeis dissents in Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 477 (1920)(arguing that evidence
obtained illegally by a private party who then turned it over to police should have been excluded
because the evidence was obtained by an unfair and unethical method), and to the Brandeis
dissent in Casey v. United States, 270 U.S. 413 (1928) (arguing that the conviction should have
been overturned on the ground of entrapment). See Cole, The Exclusionary Rule in Probation
and Parole Revocation Proceedings: Some Observations on Deterrence and the "Imperative
of Judicial Integrity," 52 CHI-KENT L. REV. 21, 39-40 (1975).
"' Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 483-85 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting). See
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 453-54 n.3 (1963)(Brennan, J., dissenting); Johnson v.
Yellow Cab Transit Co., 321 U.S. 383, 403 (1944)(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
I" Stated differently, the issue is whether the criminal should "go free" because "the constable has blundered." People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926) (Cardovo,
J.).
I Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 483-85 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
'2

12
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clearly is contrary to this assertion, it is only fair to note that Stone
did not mark the first departure. The trend to abandon the Brandeis
"clean hands" doctrine began soon after the Court decided Mapp v.
Ohio,"7 which placed the dual objectives of deterrence and integrity
on equal footing. Considering the retroactivity of Mapp,2 5 the Supreme Court said virtually nothing about the imperative of judicial
integrity; rather, it stated that the purpose of the exclusionary rule
"was to deter the lawless action of the police and to effectively enforce the Fourth Amendment."'' 2 A subsequent retroactivity decision, focused exclusively on the objective of deterring unlawful
searches and seizures, and said nothing about the preservation of
judicial integrity. 30 And, more recently, writing for the Court in
United States v. Peltier, 3' Justice Rehnquist maintained that:
the "imperative of judicial integrity" is . . .not offended if law
enforcement officials reasonably believed in good faith that their
conduct was in accordance with the law even if decisions subsequent
to the search and seizure have held that conduct of the type engaged
in by the law enforcement officials is not permitted by the Constitution. ' 2
Thus, the death knell for the judicial integrity justification for the
exclusionary rule had been tolling for some time before the resounding tenor of Stone v. Powell. But, apart from debating the preeminence of the deterrence rationale, 33 the concept of judicial integrity
14
survives in a broader setting than that of the fourth amendment.
367 U.S. 643, 656, 659 (1961).

25 Linkletter v. Ohio, 381 U.S. 618 (1965)(appeal from denial of writ of habeas corpus).

Id. at 637.
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 251-52 (1969) (notably written by Justice Stewart,
who wrote the opinion for the Court in Elkins, supra note 120).
131 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
32 Id. at 537-38 (original emphasis). See also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 35525

130

56 n.II (1974)(embracing the deterrence rationale and dismissing the idea that the spirit of
judicial integrity would be betrayed by allowing the use of illegally seized evidence in a grand
jury proceeding).
3 Compare generally Schrock & Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a
Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251 (1974) and Comment, Judicial Integrity
and Judicial Review: An Argument for Expanding the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule,
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1129 (1973) with Kaplan, The Limits ad the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN.
L. REV. 1027 (1974) and Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U.
CHIc. L. REV. 665 (1970).
'3"See, e.g., Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973): "This question [of the retroactivity of
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969)(due process limitations guard against possible
vindictiveness where judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after new trial)]
relates to the integrity of the judicial process, not to the limitations placed by the Constitution
on police behavior." Id. at 63 (Marshall, J., dissenting); In re Martinez, I Cal.3d 641,654-55,
463 P.2d 734, 743 (197 0)(allowing parole termination based upon illegally seized evidence)(Pe-
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B.

JudicialIntegrity: A Doctrinefor All Seasons

Generally, "judicial integrity" has been employed in connection
with the sanctity, probity, and rectitude of the legal process itself,
whether criminal or civil.' Indeed, "integrity" is defined as the
"soundness of and adherence to moral principle and character; uprightness; honesty . . . [or] a sound, unimpaired, or perfect condition." 3 ' Courts have used the term in a variety of contexts. References to "judicial integrity" appear in a range of cases, from discussions of a judge's partiality, bias, or conflict of interest,'37 to the
disparity among sentences imposed for similar crimes. 3 The term
has also been applied to the efficiency and effective allocation of
adjudicatory resources. 3 And courts often emphasize that the public has or should have respect for the particular process, program, or
entity at issue.4 0
ters, J., dissenting) "Reliance on the fruits of illegal government action is as destructive of the
appearance of justice . . . as it is in a more formal criminal trial".
,' See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385, 418 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967)(separate opinion of Coleman, J.)(reference to exercise of
judicial integrity in the past by judges who refused to condemn the "separate but equal" racial
standard; Lunsford v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 212 F.2d 878, 881 (5th Cir.
1954)(judicial integrity requires court of appeals to follow Tax Court recognition of a partnership); United States v. State of Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 336, 339 (W.D. Wash.
1974)(judicial integrity requires state to regulate Indian off-reservation fishing rights according
to Supreme Court precedent).
IN THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 738 (1969).
,3 See, e.g., In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 624-25 (1959).
In See, e.g., United States v. Capriola, 537 F.2d 319, 321 (9th Cir. 1976) ("when there is
a substantial disparity in sentences imposed upon different individuals for engaging in the same
criminal activity, the preservation of the appearance of judicial integrity and impartiality
requires that the sentencing judge record an explanation.").
I"' See, e.g., United States ex rel. Miller v. Pate, 429 F.2d 1001 (7th Cir. 1970) (federal
district court lacks authority to restrain state from retrying petitioner after denial of speedy
trial, when state did not comply with order to retry but instead appealed the order unsuccessfully). ("We have complete confidence in the judicial integrity of the Illinois judiciary to see
that petitioner's rights will be carefully guarded and protected in light of what has now transpired." Id. at 1003).
1, In distinguishing those issues which are "guilt-related" from those which are not, the
Supreme Court in Stone v. Powell spoke of the "integrity of the fact-finding process." 428 U.S.
at 479, quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 224 (1969).
The Supreme Court has spoken recently of the integrity of the electoral process, Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 10 (1976), the political process, Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 853
(1976)(Brennan, J., dissenting), and the arbitral process, Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.,
424 U.S. 554, 567 (1976).
Recently, the Court has discussed "integrity" in other contexts. See, e.g., United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 574 n.4 (1976)(Brennan, J., dissenting)(border patrol practices); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 386 (1976)(Marshall, J., dissenting)(closed
compartments of locked automobile); Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295, 30203 (1976)(conditions imposed by the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act).
On the integrity of the trial generally, see, e.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91
(1976); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 612 (1976).
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The "appearance of justice"' 4 is a topic frequently examined in
discussions of judicial integrity.' At the base of both abstractions is
the belief that justice itself is a nullity if the public does not perceive
it as being done, because the public then has little or no regard for
the legal system.4 3 For example, in Offutt v. United States,'" when
a federal judge displayed personal animosity and lack of proper judicial restraint during a prolonged dispute with the defense counsel, the
reviewing court debated whether contempt charges filed against the
attorney should have been tried by a different judge. Deciding in the
affirmative, the Court proclaimed:
The vital point is that in sitting in judgment on .
a misbehaving
lawyer the judge should not himself give vent to personal spleen or
respond to a personal grievance. These are subtle matters, for they
concern the ingredients of what constitutes justice. Therefore,
justice must satisfy the appearanceof justice.'"
Thus, the paramount issue is whether the Supreme Court in Stone
v. Powell violated its own general formulations of "judicial integrity"
and the "appearance of justice." We submit that it has done so.
The first reason for this assertion is that in restricting federal habeas corpus jurisdiction for state prisoners, the Court gave a "novel
reinterpretation" to the habeas statutes. 141 That is, the majority would
On the integrity of the criminal justice system, see, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,
839 (1975) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 442 (1976)
(White, J., concurring).
"' See generally J. MACKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE 241 (1974); Flannery &
Robbins, The Misunderstood Pro Se Litigant: More than a Pawn in the Game, 41 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 769, 771-72, 787-88 (1975).
"I See, e.g., United States v. Leavitt, 478 F.2d 1101, 1104 (Ist Cir. 1973)(drunken condition
of defendant does not automatically invalidate sentencing; court has discretion according to
circumstances); Roy v. Jones, 349 F. Supp. 315, 319 (W.D. Pa. 1972)(impact on community
of justice of peace requires preservation of judicial integrity and its appearance); Hobson v.
Hanson, 265 F. Supp. 902, 931 (D.D.C. 1967)(Wright, J., dissenting)("The need to preserve
judicial integrity is more than just a matter ofjudges satisfying themselves that the environment
in which they work is sufficiently free of interference to enable them to administer the law
honorably and efficiently. Litigants and our citizenry in general must also be satisfied.").
l 'Without the appearance as well as the fact of justice, respect for the law vanishes in a
democracy." In re Greenberg, 422 Pa. 411, 416, 280 A.2d 370, 372 (1971). "When the image
of the judiciary is tarnished, the moral authority of the court is critically undermined." J.
MACKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE x (1974).
The theme of "judicial integrity" appears in Farrer Herschells' well-known retort at the Bar
when Sir George Jessell attempted to cut his argument short: "Important as it is that people
should get justice, it was even more important that' they should be made to feel and see that
they were getting it." 2 J. ATLAY, VICTORIAN CHANCELLORS 460 (1908).
144 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
"1 348 U.S. at 14 (emphasis supplied).
14,428 U.S. at 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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allow the judiciary to create a hierarchy of constitutional violations,
based upon whether or not the claim "impugn[s] the integrity of the
fact-finding process."' 7 Yet the habeas statutes allow relief to state
prisoners "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of
the United States.""' The Court creates this judicial discretion with
little discussion of section 2254,"11 previously construed to grant federal jurisdiction for fourth amendment claims of state prisoners.
This lack of analytical depth is apparent also in the majority's
treatment of contradictory precedent. Avoiding direct confrontation
with the habeas statutes, the Court purported to cast its holding in
constitutional terms.'10 But the Court did not explicitly overrule any
of the numerous precedents that applied fourth amendment principles
in collateral review of state convictions; indeed, it did not even discuss
principles of stare decisis. 15' Rather, the Court asserted that those
Justices who joined in prior decisions simply overlooked the obvious
constitutional dimension. 52 The majority then obscured its own evasion in an interest balancing approach.
As long as Mapp v. Ohio'5 3 remains undisturbed, however, the
attempt to base Stone on the Constitution must fail, for under Mapp,
as a matter of federal constitutional law, a state court must exclude
evidence from the trial of an individual whose fourth and fourteenth
amendment rights were violated by a search and seizure that either
directly or indirectly resulted in the acquisition of that evidence.," As
Justice Brennan observed, "lilt is simply inconceivable that the constitutional deprivation suddenly vanishes after the appellate process
has been exhausted."' 55 There is no doubt, at least in one sense, that
the law is what the Court says it is.' But predictability based on
logical legal reasoning is a quality that any viable judicial system
W,Id. at

479.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1970).
dissenting).
"' See 428 U.S. at 516 (Brennan, J.,
I' at 506-09.
Id.
" See note 71 supra.
"
"It borders on the incredible to suggest that so many Justices for so long merely 'assumed'
dissentthe answer to such a basic jurisdictional question." 428 U.S. at 509 n.6 (Brennan, J.,
ing).
'
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
dissenting). This principle recently was reaffirmed
'54 See 428 U.S. at 509-15 (Brennan, J.,
in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). "[Elvidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal
search and seizure." Id. at 347 (emphasis supplied).
I5 at 511.
Id.
" See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) ("It
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.");
accord, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-05 (1974).
"
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must preserve.'57 In the words of Lord Coke, "the knowne certaintie
' 8
of the law is the safetie of all.' 1
Closely related to the idea of predictability is the clear incongruity
in establishing a particular principle as part of a society's theoretical
and functional jurisprudence and then announcing that there is no
principle after all. 5 9 As Professor Fuller has suitably asserted, "a
failure of congruence between the rules as announced and their actual
administration . . . does not simply result in a bad system of law; it
results in something that is not properly called a legal system at all
... ,1'In short, how can we expect the citizenry to honor the law
and the legal system if that honor is not reciprocated?' Yet this is
precisely the mold cast in Stone when the Court reaffirms the exclusionary rule, but rejects its application once the appellate process has
been exhausted. The absence of the remedy on post-conviction attack
eviscerates the right itself.' In fact, one argument employed by the
Court in Mapp to overrule its holding in Wolf v. Colorado"3 and
extend the exclusionary rule to state trial proceedings, was that
the admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf could not
consistently tolerate denial of its most important constitutional
privilege, namely, the exclusion of the [unlawfully obtained] evidence. . . . To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to
withhold its privilege and enjoyment."'
As an additional consequence, the Court discards the longstanding
principle that for purposes of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, there
are no subordinate constitutional rights.6 5 In basing its distinction on
whether claims are "guilt-related,"'8 8 the Court could limit habeas
corpus jurisdiction even further. Justice Brennan warns of such future

IS7
See, e.g.,

L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (rev. ed. 1969).
Quoted in L. GOLDBERG & E. LEVENSON, LAWLESS JUDGES 9 (1935).
'5' See Schrock & Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional
Requirement, 59 MINN. L. RaV. 251, 382-83 (1974).
I" L. Fuller, note 157 supra, at 39. Cf Jackson v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 386 U.S.
731, 736-37 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The Court holds that this ... law cannot mean
what it says . . . . [But] lilt is our duty to apply the law, not to repeal it.")
' See, e.g., L. Fuller, note 157 supra, at 39-40.
16 The Court, of course, argued that the exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional
right at all, but rather a judicially created remedy. 428 U.S. at 482, 486. But this interpretation
is questionable. See, e.g., United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 550-62 (1975)(Brennan, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 355-67 (1974)(Brennan, J., dissenting).
338 U.S. 25 (1949)(fourth amendment not app~licable to state prosecutions).
1'4 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961)(emphasis supplied). Cf Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244,
258 (1969)(Harlan, J., dissenting)("We do not release a criminal from jail because we like to
do so, or because we think it is wise to do so, but only because the government has offended
constitutional principle in the conduct of his case.")
163 See 428 U.S. at 523-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
16 See 428 U.S. at 479, 490, 517-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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constriction, "if not for all grounds of alleged unconstitutional detention, then at least for claims-for example, of double jeopardy, entrapment, self-incrimination, Miranda violations," 7 and use of invalid

identification procedures' 6 5-that this Court later decides are not

guilt-related."' 6 Yet this potential hierarchy of federal constitutional
rights ignores both the principles of stare decisis and Congress' failure to alter habeas statutes after they were judicially interpreted as
recognizing all federal constitutional contentions. "'

Another egregious element of the majority opinion is its view of
federalism, finality, and the effective use of judicial resources.
In rejecting collateral fourth amendment claims from state prisoners,
the Court effectively ignores the settled principle that Congress has

cast district courts in the role of surrogate Supreme Courts to adjudicate habeas actions which assert constitutional claims.' It is for
Congress, and not the courts, to decide what is the most efficacious
method to enforce federal constitutional rights.' According to the
law and spirit of habeas corpus prior to Stone, "conventional notions

of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the
manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal
liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary
"I See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)(prosecution may not use statements stemming from custodial interrogation of defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.) (Indeed, the recent case
of Brewer v. Williams,
- U.S. 97 S. Ct. 1232 (1977) (five-to-four decision) (§ 2254
appeal of sixth and fourteenth amendment violations) threatened to extend Stone v. Powell to
Miranda cases. See 97 S. Ct. at 1246-47 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 1250-54 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). See note 66 supra.
I" The application of Stone v. Powell to this issue is now before the Court in Manson v.
Braithwaite, argued, 45 U.S.L.W. 3412 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1976)(No. 75-371).
I See 428 U.S. at 517-518 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(Brennan notes other possible "guiltrelated" claims. The application of Stone v. Powell in the use of habeas corpus to review the
standard for fair representation of a minority group on a local grand jury was before the Court
recently in Castaneda v. Partida, U.S. -, 97 S. Ct. 1272 (1977), but was not a ground
for the Court's decision. See also Maness v. Wainwright, writ of certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 4331 (1977)(application of rule preventing defendant from impeaching his own witness).
* See 428 U.S. at 522 (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
' See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953):
It is not for us to determine whether this power should have been vested in the federal
courts . . . . [Tihe wisdom of such a modification in the law is for Congress to
consider . . . .It is for this Court to give fair effect to the habeas corpus jurisdiction
as enacted by Congress. By giving the federal courts that jurisdiction, Congress has
imbedded into federal legislation the historic function of habeas corpus adapted to
reaching an enlarged area of claims . ...
Id. at 499-500. See also Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 247 (1967)(Congress made federal
judges "the primary and powerful reliances for vindicating every right given by the Constitution, the laws, and treaties of the United States.") (original emphasis).
"7 See note 171 supra.
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federal judicial review."'7 Federal courts were to "have the 'last say'
with respect to questions of federal law."'7 Where constitutional
rights were at stake, the integrity of proceedings at and before trial
required "the continuing availability of a mechanism for relief."' 7
"[N]o binding weight is to be attached to the State determination.
The congressional requirement is greater. The State Court cannot
have the last say whenit, though on fair consideration of what procedurally may be deemed fairness, may have misconceived a federal
7
constitutional right."'

Following Townsend v. Sainm" and Fay v. Noia,7 8 congressional
actions indicated its belief that the superior authority of federal law
should be asserted in federal courts.' As Congress modified the
habeas statutes to incorporate Townsend and provide a limited res
judicata effect for factual determinations of state judges, 180 it did
not modify the principles of Brown, Fay, and Kaufman. According to these cases, collateral relief was to be available with respect to
any constitutional deprivation and federal district judges, subject only
to appellate review, were to be the spokesmen for the supremacy of
federal law.' 8 '
Without question, Stone v. Powell has contravened these wellestablished principles. In so doing, we submit that it has degraded the
virtues of logic and candor, 8 ' and eliminated the essential elements
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424 (1963)(emphasis added).
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 225 (1969). See generally L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 589 (1965).
"I Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 226 (1969). See also Mackey v. United States,
401 U.S. 667, 685-87 (1971)(opinion of Harlan, J.).
In essence, the issue of the proper point of repose for the criminal process deals with two
fundamental questions: whether we can determine adequately, with our present state of knowledge, (i) that those acts which we define as criminal and, therefore, punish, should be so defined
and punished, and (2) that our criminal process is a rational and fair one. If both questions
are answered in the affirmative, the next question is whether the closing of the traditional
"safety valve" of habeas corpus will increase the pressure at other points in the system, such
as parole and clemency, or, indeed, whether extra-legal pressures, such as riot and revolt will
result. This "safety valve" theory will be the subject of a future article.
For other recent decisions restricting access to federal redress of grievances, see, e.g., Eastern
Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501
(1976); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). But see
97 S. Ct. 1491 (1977).
U.S. -,
Bounds v. Smith, 116Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 508 (1953).
.7 372 U.S. 293 (1963); see notes 26-27, 101-104 supra and accompanying text.
'~' 372 U.S. 391 (1963); see notes 22-25 supra and accompanying text.
'T' See notes 86-87 supra.
'
428 U.S. at 528 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"l Id.
"1 See generally Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on
the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198 (1971).
'7
'
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of any viable legal order-judicial integrity and the appearance of
justice.
V.

CONCLUSION:

ON Stone AND GLASS HOUSES

Potentially, Stone could pulverize federal relief for rights expressed

in or derived from other constitutional amendments." 3 Another possibility is that federal habeas corpus jurisdiction will be foreclosed
where state post-conviction statutes mirror the federal relief available
under section 2255.14 Even Sanders v. United States,185 the third case
of the 1963 trilogy, is under debate."' 6 Moreover, the occasionally
advanced argument that federal habeas corpus relief should be available only to those who present a colorable claim of innocence'87 may
be only a Stone's throw away.'8 But if one or more of these approaches is taken, it will contradict earlier positions held by the

Supreme Court, such as that "[hlabeas corpus is one of the precious
heritages of Anglo-American civilization,"'88 and that "[i]t must
never be forgotten that the writ of habeas corpus is the precious
safeguard of personal liberty and there is no higher duty than to
maintain it unimpaired."'110 It is, of course, true that change may be
indispensable to the dynamic quality of the law,' and that if the
Court desires to follow one of the above routes it will be able to do
"I See notes 167-69 supra. See also Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976) (habeas
corpus must be denied unless actual prejudices could be shown to have resulted from the
composition of the grand jury).
U.S. _ 97 S.Ct. 1224 (1977)(federal court was prohibited
I" See Swain v. Pressley, by D.C. statute from entertaining application for writ from D.C. prisoner, where statute provides adequate fact finding procedure and was deliberately patterned after 28 U.S.C. § 2255).
"n 373 U.S. 1 (1963). See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
IM See Kelley, Finality and Habeas Corpus: Is the Rule that Res JudicataMay Not Apply
to Habeas Corpus or Motion to Vacate Still Viable?, 78 W. VA. L. REv. 1 (1975).
"7 See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 258 (1973)(Powell, J., concurring);
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 234, 237 (1969)(Black, J., dissenting); Friendly, Is
Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142
(1970).
' See 428 U.S. at 479, 490; Boyte, Federal Habeas Corpus After Stone v. Powell: A
Remedy Only for the Arguably Innocent?, II U. RICHMOND L. REV. 291 (1977).
'' Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 441 (1963).
IN Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939); see Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 346
(1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[Habeas corpus cuts through all forms and goes to the very
tissue of the structure. It comes in from the outside, not in subordination to the proceedings,
and although every form may have been preserved opens the inquiry whether they have been
more than an empty shell.") See also Chafee, The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution, 32 B.U.L. REV. 143 (1952). See generally Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695 (1949)
(guilt or innocence irrelevant to habeas corpus review); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 8788 (1923) (Holmes, J.,); cf Thompson v. Church, I Root 312 (Conn. 1791) ("[Tlhe business
of the court is to try the case, and not the man; . . . a very bad man may have a very righteous
case.").
'' See, e.g., E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2 (1949).
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for legal reasoning has a logic of its own. But if it does go in

such a direction, the Court should be mindful of Cardozo's admonition that there is a "tendency of a principle to expand itself beyond
the limit of its logic.""' In Stone v. Powell, the Court curtailed
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction with inadequate explanations and
improper reasoning, and failed to address fundamental issues presented by the case. In curbing the exclusionary rule, the Court may
hope that the public will hold judicial proceedings in more esteem.
But in the long-run, the Court may lose broader respect for the entire
legal system."'
12 See note 156 supra and accompanying text. "[Ulnless the appellate judge handling the
case is a dullard, some doctrine is always at hand to achieve the ends of justice, as they appear
to the appellate court." Wright, The Doubtful Onmiscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L.
REV. 751 (1957). "[The Constitution is] a mere thing of wax in the hands of the judiciary, which
they may twist and shape into any form they please." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge
Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), reprinted in L. GOLDBERG & E. LEVENSON, LAWLESS JUDGES
I1 (1935).
US B. Cardozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1921). The Court also would
do well to bear in mind its own admonition in a different context in Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886), that "illegitimate ... practices get their first footing . . . by silent
approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure."
"I "Whoso diggeth a pit shall fall therein: and he that rolleth a Stone, it will return upon
him." Proverbs 26:27 (King James version)(capitalization and emphasis supplied). See also
Doyle v. Hofstader, 257 N.Y. 244, 268, 177 N.E. 489, 498 (1931)(Cardozo, J.)("A community
whose judges would be willing to give it whatever law might gratify the impulse of the moment
would find in the end that it had paid too high a price for relieving itself of the bother of
awaiting a session of the Legislature and the enactment of a statute in accordance with established forms.")
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